Optimal Issuance under Information Asymmetry and Accumulation of Cash Flows by Strebulaev, Ilya A et al.
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Finance Papers Wharton Faculty Research
7-18-2016
Optimal Issuance under Information Asymmetry
and Accumulation of Cash Flows
Ilya A. Strebulaev
Haoxiang Zhu
Pavel Zryumov
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/fnce_papers
Part of the Finance and Financial Management Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/fnce_papers/20
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Strebulaev, I. A., Zhu, H., & Zryumov, P. (2016). Optimal Issuance under Information Asymmetry and Accumulation of Cash Flows.
Retrieved from http://repository.upenn.edu/fnce_papers/20
Optimal Issuance under Information Asymmetry and Accumulation of
Cash Flows
Abstract
We study the optimal timing of security issuance to finance a new project when the firm's assets in place have
unobservable quality. Stochastic cash flows generated by assets in place reveal information about their quality
and simultaneously reduce the required outside funding. A high-quality firm optimally delays issuance unless
its accumulated cash or the market belief about its quality is sufficiently high. A low-quality firm does the same
and, additionally, issues if market belief and accumulated cash are sufficiently low. Under stated restrictions,
the renegotiation-proof optimal security pays outside investors in full before paying anything to original
shareholders.
Keywords
dynamic information asymmetry, financing, cash flow accumulation, issuance delay, optimal security
Disciplines
Finance and Financial Management
This working paper is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/fnce_papers/20
Optimal Issuance under Information Asymmetry and
Accumulation of Cash Flows∗
Ilya A. Strebulaev† Haoxiang Zhu‡ Pavel Zryumov§
July 18, 2016
Abstract
We study the optimal timing of security issuance to finance a new project when the
firm’s assets in place have unobservable quality. Stochastic cash flows generated by
assets in place reveal information about their quality and simultaneously reduce the
required outside funding. A high-quality firm optimally delays issuance unless its
accumulated cash or the market belief about its quality is sufficiently high. A low-
quality firm does the same and, additionally, issues if market belief and accumulated
cash are sufficiently low. Under stated restrictions, the renegotiation-proof optimal
security pays outside investors in full before paying anything to original shareholders.
JEL Codes: G31, G32
Keywords: dynamic information asymmetry, financing, cash flow accumulation, is-
suance delay, optimal security
∗First version: June 2009. A previous version of the paper was circulated under the title “Dynamic
Information Asymmetry, Financing, and Investment Decisions”. For helpful discussions and comments,
we thank Anat Admati, Hui Chen, Peter DeMarzo, Brett Green, Mike Harrison, Zhiguo He, Deborah
Lucas, Leonid Kogan, Andrey Malenko, Erwan Morellec, Stewart Myers, Jonathan Parker, Stephen Ross,
Norman Schu¨rhoff, Bilge Yilmaz, and seminar participants at Stanford GSB, MIT, UNC-Duke Corporate
Finance Conference, Wharton, Rochester Simon, HKUST, Beijing University, Tsinghua University, EPFL,
and University of Lausanne. Paper URL: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2356144.
†Graduate School of Business, Stanford University and NBER. Email: istrebulaev@stanford.edu.
‡MIT Sloan School of Management and NBER. Email: zhuh@mit.edu.
§Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. Email: pzryumov@wharton.upenn.edu.
1 Introduction
A classic problem in corporate finance is how firms raise capital in the presence of asym-
metric information. The seminal paper by Myers and Majluf (1984) begins by stating the
following problem: “Consider a firm that has assets in place and also a valuable real invest-
ment opportunity. However, it has to issue common shares to raise part or all of the cash
required to undertake the investment project. If it does not launch the project promptly, the
opportunity will evaporate.” A major finding of Myers and Majluf (1984) is that adverse
selection can cause a financial market breakdown because the market cannot ascertain the
quality of a firm’s assets in place and will only offer a price that a high-quality firm finds
too low to accept.
This market breakdown occurs in Myers and Majluf (1984) largely because the firm’s
manager has a single opportunity to raise capital and make the investment. In many prac-
tical applications, however, investment opportunities do not “evaporate” if not undertaken
immediately. A firm usually has the option to delay financing and investment if the market
conditions are unfavorable. A natural question, therefore, is how the firm should optimally
time its financing and investment decisions to minimize adverse selection cost.
A major contribution in this direction is made by Daley and Green (2012). They consider
a dynamic lemons market in which a seller wishes to sell an indivisible asset with unobservable
quality, and buyers observe “news”, or signals about the asset’s quality over time. As news
arrives, the market updates its belief about the asset quality, and a sale ultimately takes
place. At any point in time, if the market is sufficiently optimistic about the asset quality,
both types of sellers sell at the average price. If the market is sufficiently pessimistic about
asset quality, only the low-quality seller sells, at the low price. For market beliefs between
these two thresholds, both types of sellers wait for news and delay sales.
An important assumption in Daley and Green (2012) is that information about the asset
quality does not affect the gains from trade between buyers and sellers, and only affects the
beliefs of the buyers. In financial markets, however, information about assets often comes in
the form of cash flows generated by these assets. This seemingly minor detail has important
and interesting economic consequences. A higher-than-expected cash flow simultaneously
conveys positive information about the firm’s assets in place and relaxes a firm’s financial
constraint. Both channels reduce a high-quality firm’s adverse selection cost in raising outside
capital.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first that formally analyzes the dual role
of cash flows—reducing asymmetric information and relaxing financial constraint—when a
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firm wishes to raise outside financing under asymmetric information about its assets in place.
We solve for the optimal timing of issuance as well as for the optimal security being issued.
Our model and result work roughly as follows. Time is continuous, t ∈ [0,∞). An
all-equity firm’s assets in place could be one of two types, high or low. The firm’s type
is observable only to the firm’s management and not to the market. The assets in place
generate unit cash flows that arrive according to a Poisson process, with intensity µH for
the high type and intensity µL for the low type. Cash flows are observable and verifiable.
Moreover, we allow for accumulation of cash flows within the firm. At time 0, the firm also
has a positive-NPV investment opportunity. The investment requires a cash outlay of I,
which is a positive integer. Once undertaken, the new project immediately increases the
rate of cash flow arrivals from µθ to µθ + k, where θ ∈ {H,L} is the unobservable type and
k is a commonly known constant. We assume that the firm cannot spin off the new project
and finance it separately; instead, the firm must issue securities on the entire firm (assets in
place plus new project) to finance investment. The firm chooses the timing of investment
and the security type from a broad class of securities that we specify later. The market is
competitive and only seeks to break even in expectation. Everyone is risk neutral.
Our primary contribution is to characterize the optimal timing of issuance and investment
when cash flows reveal information and relax financial constraint. For ease of discussion, let
us take the optimal security as given for now and describe its properties shortly. (The analysis
on the optimal issuance timing actually works for any given security.) The general shape of
the equilibrium strategy of the two types of firms is illustrated in the Figure 1 below. In the
figure, p denotes the probability that the firm is of the high type and n denotes the amount
of cash already saved within the firm. In equilibrium, there are two belief thresholds, p and
p, partitioning the (p, n) space into three regions: pooling, separating, and waiting.
In the pooling region, i.e., p > p, both types of firm immediately issue at the average
“pooling” price. The high type firm suffers some adverse selection cost, but this cost is
dominated by the early realization of the positive NPV of the new project. Obviously,
the low type firm also issues whenever the high type firm does. On one hand, for a fixed
n, pooling is more likely if p is higher because the high type firm suffers a lower adverse
selection cost on the amounts to be raised, I−n. This information channel is similar to that
of Daley and Green (2012). On other other hand, for a fixed p, pooling is more likely if n
is larger because the amount to be raised in the market, I − n, gets smaller. This financial
constraint channel is new to our model.
In the waiting region, i.e., p ∈ [p, p], both types delay. Again, the high type waits for
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Figure 1: Equilibrium belief thresholds as functions of internal cash level.
a new cash flow because the cash flow will improve the market belief and relax the firm’s
financial constraint. By contrast, the low type firm waits only because he wishes to imitate
the high type for a chance to reach the pooling region, where he would sell the security
at an inflated price (relative to the low type’s firm value). If the internal cash saving n is
sufficiently large, the waiting region actually degenerates into a point.
As illustrated in Figure 1, given current market belief p and internal cash n in the
waiting region, the arrival of a new cash flow not only increases the market belief to p′ > p
but also increases the cash reserve to n + 1. In this example, the combination of both
channels triggers immediate issuance. By contrast, the information channel of Daley and
Green (2012) corresponds to the evolution of (p, n) to (p′, n).
The separating region (p < p) obtains if the market belief and internal cash is sufficiently
low. In this case the low type firm expects a very long waiting time to reach the pooling
region, if ever. His optimal strategy is to reveal his type probabilistically and raise funds at
the low “separating” price.
Now, let us turn to the optimal security design. Since it is a dynamic market, we look
for securities that are renegotiation-proof after issuance. As it turns out, it is possible to
characterize the renegotiation-proof optimal security under two assumptions/restrictions.
First, recovery value upon default is zero. This assumption implies that the new security
holders only get paid when cash flows arrive. Second, at issuance, the division of future cash
flows between the original shareholders and new security holders is deterministic (i.e., not
contingent upon events yet to realize). The optimal security stipulates that shareholders
cannot be paid sooner than outside investors. The optimal security is illustrated in Figure
3
2 below. Specifically, the optimal security specifies an endogenous integer J ≥ 1 such that
cash flows 1, 2, ..., J − 1 are paid exclusively to the new security holders (full solid fill), cash
flow J is possibly split between equity holders and new security holders (partial solid fill),
and cash flows J + 1, J + 2, ... are paid exclusively to equity holders (no solid fill).
Nt
1
1 2
. . .
J − 1 J J + 1
. . .
Figure 2: Payment schedule of the optimal security. For each cash flow (bar), the solid fill
represents the payment to new security holders and white space represents the payment to
original shareholders.
The front-loading of cash flows in the optimal security is intuitive. Just like the timing
of issuance, the security choice is determined in equilibrium by the high type firm, whose
objective is to minimize adverse selection costs. The more distant is a cash flow in the future,
the more severe is adverse selection. Thus, the security that minimizes adverse section cost
for the high type firm should front-load payments to new security holders as much as possible.
Our theory makes a few unique empirical predictions. First, issuance and investment can
happen after lower-than-expected cash flows. In the model, this is driven by the separation
of the low type firm. For example, Korajczyk, Lucas, and McDonald (1990) find that while
most equity issuances take place after large positive abnormal returns, 18% of issuances
occur after share price declines relative to the market. Second, if issuance follows lower-
than-expected cash flows, the post-issue market value of the firm immediately jumps down
because issuance in this case is by separation of the low type, a negative signal of the quality
of assets in place. By contrast, if issuance follows higher-than-expected cash flows, the
post-issue market value of the firm remains a martingale because issuance in this case is
by pooling. Third, conditional on issuance after lower-than-expected cash flows, the size of
downward drop in market value of the firm is generally non-monotone in the level of internal
cash reserves. This is because the separating belief threshold p is generally non-monotone
in internal cash (see Figure 1). Thus, it is possible to see a larger drop in firm value even if
the firm’s cash reserve is higher. Finally, the high type firm accumulates more cash prior to
investment than the low type does, because the high type only issues in the pooling region
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but the low type issues in both the pooling and separating regions. Thus, firms making
investment using more internal cash would have higher subsequent returns.
From a methodology perspective, our solution technique of the optimal timing of is-
suance may also be useful in handling other dynamic adverse selection problems with two-
dimensional state variables. A key step in our solution method is to discretize the level of
internal cash, which allows us to define the value functions with cash level n recursively by
the value function with cash level n+ 1.
Related Literature
The classic problem of issuance and investment under asymmetric information has been
studied by many papers since Myers and Majluf (1984). The main theme of this literature is
how a high type firm reduces its adverse selection cost. Our results contribute to two ways
of doing so: delayed issuance and security design.
On delayed issuance, the most related paper is Daley and Green (2012). As discussed
above, in Daley and Green (2012) new information only gradually reveals the type of the
seller but does not affect the seller’s financial constraint or willingness to sell. In our model,
not only do cash flows gradually reveal the quality of the assets in place, they also relax the
firm’s financial constraint and reduce the amount of required outside funding. The incentive
to delay issuance and investment becomes stronger. Moreover, we also go beyond Daley and
Green (2012) in solving the renegotiation-proof optimal security.
Investment delay in our model (and that of Daley and Green (2012)) has an economic
underpinning that is distinct from those in the real option literature, where investment delays
are caused by the optimal timing of real option exercise. For instance, Morellec and Schu¨rhoff
(2011) consider a real option setting in which the firm chooses the optimal investment timing
as well as the type of security to issue. They model the firm’s revenue from the new project
as the firm’s unobservable type multiplied by a publicly observable cash flow process. The
observable cash flow shocks in their model are independent of firm type and hence cannot
reveal information about the firm’s type over time. In our model, the market learns about the
firm’s type by observing its cash flows; the firm delays investment because learning reduces
adverse selection and because accumulated cash reduces required outside funding.
Some earlier models feature short-lived information asymmetry. For instance, Lucas and
McDonald (1990) consider the impact of information asymmetry on equity financing deci-
sions. In their model, information asymmetry is reset at fixed time intervals, so undervalued
firms do not issue equity until the complete resolution of information asymmetry. The im-
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mediate issuance by overvalued firms and the delayed issuance by undervalued firms jointly
predict an increase in share prices prior to issuance. More recently, Hennessy, Livdan, and
Miranda (2010) develop a dynamic signaling model of investment and financing. In their
paper, the firm’s manager has superior information relative to the market, but this informa-
tional advantage is short-lived. Markovian evolution of the firm’s type together with short
lived private information generate a time-invariant level of information asymmetry in their
model. In contrast to both Lucas and McDonald (1990) and Hennessy, Livdan, and Miranda
(2010), our model features persistent, time-varying information asymmetry, stemming from
persistent firm types and gradual information revelation.
The second way of reducing adverse selection cost is by security design. Models in
this category tend to be static. Nachman and Noe (1994) show that if the probability
distribution of the firm’s value satisfies the “conditional stochastic dominance,” debt is the
optimal security. Although the optimal security in our model is not debt in the conventional
sense (fixed payments at fixed times), the economic underlying mechanism is quite closely
linked to Nachman and Noe (1994), as we discuss in Section 3.
When conditional stochastic dominance is violated, there are no one-size-fits-all designs
of the optimal security. For example, Fulghieri, Garcia, and Hackbarth (2015) show that,
depending on model parameters and the existing capital structure, the optimal security could
be straight debt, convertible debt, or warrants.
Chakraborty and Yilmaz (2011) show that in some situations the adverse selection prob-
lem can be costlessly solved by the issuance of properly structured convertible debt. Their
result requires that (i) information asymmetry should be sufficiently low at the time of ma-
turity of the convertible debt, and (ii) managers cannot benefit from the assets in place or
the growth option before the debt matures. In our setup, the availability of cash flows prior
to the resolution of market uncertainty limits the benefits of using convertible bonds. In this
respect, our results complement those of Chakraborty and Yilmaz (2011).
Our model does not analyze costly signaling by creatively using cash reserves. Bond
and Zhong (2016) consider a multi-period Myers and Majluf (1984) in which the firm may
repurchase shares using a small amount of cash before raising a larger amount later. While
desirable for the sake of generality, a model extension combining the dual role of cash flows
and stock repurchases quickly becomes intractable. Nonetheless, our economic insights and
Bond and Zhong’s do complement each other.
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2 Model
In this section, we develop a dynamic model of financing and investment decisions under
asymmetric information. For ease of reference, Appendix A provides a glossary of the main
model variables.
2.1 The Firm and the Market
Assets in Place. Consider an all-equity firm with pledgable assets in place that belong
to one of two types θ, θ ∈ {H,L}. The type is the private information of the firm’s manage-
ment, which we simply refer to as the “firm.” As in Myers and Majluf (1984), the existing
shareholders are passive, and there is no conflict of interest between existing shareholders
and management. All parameters other than the firm’s type are common knowledge and
the prior probability that θ = H is p0 ∈ (0, 1). The cumulative cash flows generated by the
assets in place of the type θ firm at time t is given by N θt , which is a Poisson process with
intensity of arrival µθ with µH > µL > 0. That is, after the previous cash flow arrival, one
unit of new cash flow arrives at an exponentially distributed random time with expected
time of waiting 1/µθ. These cash flows are commonly observable and verifiable. Without
loss of generality, at time t = 0 the firm has zero cash reserve. Future payoffs are discounted
at a rate r > 0. Thus, the net present value (NPV) of the assets in place of type θ firm is
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rtdN θt
∣∣∣ θ] = µθ
r
. (1)
In addition to its assets in place, the firm has a growth option, which consists of a
monopoly access to a new investment opportunity. The firm can invest at any time.1 The
firm is unable to spin-off the new project and finance it independently of the assets in
place.2 If undertaken, the new project immediately incurs a one-off cost of I, where I is a
positive integer, and increases the rate of free cash flow arrival from µθ to µθ + k, where k
is a commonly known positive constant that is independent of θ. A type-independent new
project provides a clear benchmark and allows us to focus on the asymmetric information of
1If the investment opportunity expires with some intensity, then the firm effectively has a higher discount
rate than r, but the qualitative nature of our results still applies.
2This would be the case if the new project is inherently nonseparable from the assets in place. For
example, they may use the same property, machinery, and key personnel.
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assets in place.3 The NPV of the new project is thus k
r
− I, which we assume to be positive:
k
r
> I. (2)
The total cost of investment I can be funded with a combination of accumulated internal
cash and capital raised from outside investors. Prior to raising external funds and investing,
the cash flows generated by the assets in place are assumed to be saved within the firm
and used to (partially) finance the new project. One way to interpret this blunt-appearing
assumption is that the firm has no credible way to prove its use of accumulated cash other
than undertake the investment. For example, Bond and Zhong (2016) consider repurchase
of underpriced shares from the market. In their model, repurchases happen partly because
it is profitable for undervalued firms and partly because it improves terms for subsequent
issuance. In our setting, because shareholders and managers have no conflict of interest, the
repurchase of shares is merely a transfer from shareholders to themselves, and hence cannot
be a costly, credible signal. For a similar reason, paying dividends to shareholders cannot
be a credible signal of firm quality, either. Besides these motivations, the assumption that
accumulated cash is automatically saved within the firm is primarily made for tractability.
Finally, almost without loss of generality, we assume that cash savings within the firm earn
zero return.4
Security Issuance. The firm can raise funds from outside investors at any time t ∈ [0,∞)
by issuing a security S. Every security S issued at time t can be characterized by a stochastic
process (St+s)s≥0, where St+s is the cumulative payment, without discounting, to investors
up to time t+ s. We will focus attention to the following class of securities, denoted S, that
the firm can issue. We call S the feasible class of securities.
Definition 1 A security S issued at time t belongs to class S if its cumulative payment
3One could overlay asymmetric information about the new project by adjusting our model, but such
an extension does not change our main results. For example, we can incorporate type-dependent k as
follows. Denote by kθ the increase in a type-θ firm’s cash flow arrival rate after investment. As long as
µH+kH > µL+kL the same solution procedure carries through and the qualitative nature of the equilibrium
does not change.
4This assumption allows us to solve a complicated two dimensional problem by discretizing the state
space along one of the dimensions. One way to incorporate interest-bearing internal cash savings is to
consider a cash-flow generating process ∆N · Nt for a arbitrary small ∆N > 0 and allow discrete internal
cash appreciation. Qualitatively, a positive rate of return on internal cash holdings increases incentives of
the high type firm to delay investment, by reducing the implied costs of waiting.
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process can be decomposed as follows:
dSt+s = dS
d
t+s + λNt+s−NtdNt+s, (3)
where
(i) Sdt+s is a deterministic non-decreasing function of s, given public information observed
up to time t;
(ii) (λn)
∞
n=1 is a deterministic sequence with 0 ≤ λn ≤ 1 for all n, given public information
observed up to time t; and
(iii) Nt+s−Nt is the cumulative cash flow of the firm generated in the time interval (t, t+s].
The class S of securities is broad enough to include many commonly used securities,
including:
• equity (with Sdt ≡ 0 for all t and λn ≡ α < 1 for some α for all n);
• fixed maturity zero-coupon debt (with dSdT > 0 for some fixed T and λn ≡ 0 for all n);
• perpetuity debt (with dSdt = cdt for some c > 0 and λn ≡ 0 for all n); and
• any combination of those instruments.
The main restrictive feature of class S is that the division of upcoming cash flows between
the firm and the market is determined at issuance, rather than contingent on information
that is potentially revealed later. For instance, a security issued at time 0 that says “the
holder of the security receives 100% of the first cash flow if the first cash flow arrives within
one month, and nothing otherwise” is not in class S, because the division of the first cash
flow is contingent on events that are yet to realize at time of issuance. That said, our solution
technique for the optimal timing of issuance actually does not hinge upon the security itself.
As long as the issued security does not entirely eliminate the adverse selection problem, the
intuition behind our results is applicable for securities beyond class S.
Market. There is a group of competitive risk-neutral outside investors, called the “mar-
ket,” who do not observe θ. The market has a prior belief p0 at time 0 that the firm is of
type H. The market participants are risk-neutral, discount future payoffs at a rate r > 0,
and update their beliefs about the firm based on the history of cash flows, timing of issuance,
and the type of security chosen.
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Post-Issuance. Once a security is issued and the new project is undertaken, the cash flows
may be used to pay dividend to existing shareholders, pay the obligations to the holders of
the new security, or be kept within the firm. Denote by Dt the cumulative dividend paid
to shareholders up to time t. The amount of cash Ct the firm keeps for future payments is
given by
Ct = Nt − St −Dt. (4)
If at any time τ , the firm is scheduled to pay the security holder (dSτ > 0) but runs
out of cash (Cτ = 0), it defaults. For simplicity, we make the following assumption about
default.
Assumption 1 The firm has zero recovery value upon default.
Although the zero-recovery-value assumption seems strong, it is not unreasonable for
firms in either one of the following situations. First, the firm’s assets are valuable only if
combined with the human capital of key personnel, who are unlikely to stay if the firm is
in bankruptcy. Second, the firm structure is so complicated that liquidation is long and
painful, and the security holders would be willing to accept a much lower market value for
their claims. For instance, right after Lehman Brothers filed bankruptcy in 2008, the CDS-
auction-determined recovery value of Lehman senior debt was below 9 cents on the dollar
(see Du and Zhu (2016)). As of early 2015, Lehman’s estimated recovery value is more than
32 cents on the dollar.5
We allow the firm to renegotiate future payments to the security holders at any time after
issuance but prior to default. Renegotiation is an important feature of a dynamic model,
in which “the game is not over” after issuance. The renegotiation protocol is specified as
follows.
Assumption 2 At any time t after issuance:
1. Shareholders may propose a take-it-or-leave-it new schedule of payments (S˜u)u≥t.
2. The security holders either accept or reject.
3. If the security holders accept, the new security (S˜u)u≥t replaces the old one immediately;
otherwise, the initial security (Su)u≥t remains in place.
5See “Lehman to Pay Out Additional $7.6 Billion to Creditors,” by Patrick Fitzgerald, Wall Street
Journal, March 26, 2015.
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For simplicity, we view the new security holders as one entity that is not subject to free-riding
or hold-out problems.
As we elaborate shortly, the combination of zero recovery value and renegotiation implies
that there are no defaults on equilibrium path. If a pending payment dSt > 0 is due in the
next instant and the firm has zero cash, the shareholders can always propose to postpone
the payment dSt to some later date, and the security holders will agree, for the failure of
renegotiation implies zero recovery value.
Because promised payments from securities that can be renegotiated will not be creditable
anyway, we will focus on securities that are renegotiation-proof.
Definition 2 A security S is called renegotiation-proof, written as S ∈ SRP , if no type
of firm can strictly gain by successfully renegotiating its payments at any point in time after
issuance.
2.2 Strategies
Now, we turn to the firm’s and the market’s strategies.
Instead of defining strategies of the market explicitly, we model the market as a collection
of price processes M(S) = (Mt(S))t≥0 for all S ∈ S, where Mt(S) is the price that the market
is willing to pay to the issuer of security S at time t. This modeling approach is without
loss of generality. In order to allow for mixed strategies of the market, we require that
for all S ∈ S, the process M(S) is adapted to FN × FRM ,
where FN = (FNt )t≥0 is the filtration generated by firm’s cash flow process Nt and FRM is a
sufficiently rich6 filtration independent of FN .7 Intuitively, FN allows the security prices to
depend on the market beliefs about the firm’s type, and FRM allows for additional random-
ization conditional on market belief.
Heuristically, an issuing strategy of the firm is a choice of the security and the probability
of issuance at any time t. Formally, we define a mixed strategy of a type θ firm to be a pair
of processes (Sθ, piθ). The process Sθ is adapted to the filtration FM of observed market
prices M(S), for all S ∈ S. At every point in time t, Sθt is the security chosen by type θ. piθt
6It is sufficient for FRM to contain a countable number of independent uniform random variables.
7Throughout the paper we assume that all filtrations satisfy standard conditions, i.e., that they are right
continuous and contain all P-null sets. All processes are assumed to be ca´dla´g (right continuous with existing
left limits).
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is the cumulative probability of issuance by the type θ firm up to time t. This definition of
strategies accommodates randomized issuance conditional on observed price Mt(S
θ).
As an example, consider the following “pure” strategy: issue security Sˆ as soon as its
price is above some threshold Mˆ . The corresponding processes (Sθ, piθ) are given by
Sθt ≡ Sˆ, piθt =

0, if sup
s≤t
Mt(S
θ
t ) < Mˆ,
1, if sup
s≤t
Mt(S
θ
t ) ≥ Mˆ.
(5)
Our general definition of the mixed strategies allows the firm to mix every instance between
issuing security Sθt and waiting with “probabilities”
dpiθt
1−piθt−
and 1 − dpiθt
1−piθt−
, respectively. The
firm may choose not to issue at all, that is, P(limt→∞ piθt = 1) could be less that 1.
After issuing a renegotiation-proof security S ∈ SRP at time t the firm decides on the
dividend policy. Define the dividend strategy of the type θ firm to be a process Dθ =
(Dθt+s)s≥0 adapted to FN with Dθt+s being the cumulative dividend paid up to time t+ s by
type θ firm.
2.3 Equilibrium
For every renegotiation-proof security S ∈ SRP issued at time t, let D∗ be the optimal
dividend policy that maximizes the shareholders’ value:
F θE(S) ≡ sup
D
E
[∫ τ
t
e−rydDt+y
∣∣∣ θ] , (6)
where τ = inf{y > 0 : Ct+y = Nt+y − Nt −Dt+y − St+y < 0} is the time of default. Then,
F θE(S) is the resulting supremum of shareholders’ value given security S and type θ.
Let F θM(S) denote the implied market value of the security S conditional on the type θ:
F θM(S) = E
[∫ τ∗
t
e−rydSt+y
∣∣∣ θ] , (7)
where τ ∗ = inf{y > 0 : Ct+y = Nt+y −Nt −D∗t+y − St+y < 0} and D∗ solves (6).
We are now ready to define the equilibrium in our model.
Definition 3 Strategies of the firm (Sθ, piθ), θ ∈ {H,L}, market prices M(S), S ∈ S, and
market belief p constitute an equilibrium if:
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1. Optimality: For each type θ, the strategy (Sθ, piθ) maximizes the value of the firm’s
original shareholders, given the market prices M(S), S ∈ S:
(Sθ, piθ) ∈ argmaxS,pi E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rt F θE(St) dpit
]
. (8)
2. Zero Profit: Conditional on the firm’s investment at time t, the market earns zero
profits. That is, if a high type firm and a low type firm issue the same security S in
equilibrium, then
Mt(S) = E
[
F θM(S)
∣∣∣ pt, piH , piL] . (9)
Otherwise (i.e., SHt 6= SLt ),
Mt(S
θ
t ) = F
θ
M(S
θ
t ). (10)
3. Consistency: Market belief pt is consistent with the history of cash flows and strate-
gies of the firm, i.e., it satisfied Bayes rule along the equilibrium path.
Optimality and consistency are standard features of any equilibrium. Firm optimality
is required by Part 1 of Definition 3, while Parts 2 and 3 of Definition 3 guarantee market
optimality. Since our market is perfectly competitive, investors earn zero profits (Part 2)
any time the firm issues any security.
3 Optimal Security Design Conditional on Issuance
The general problem of dynamic financing can be decomposed into the optimal timing of
issuance and the security choice conditional on issuance. In this section we solve for the
optimal security conditional on the firm deciding to issue and invest. Of course, the decision
to issue and invest is consistent with the optimal security being issued. The optimal timing
of issuing the optimal security will be solved in the Section 4.
Conditional on issuance, the security choice is determined by only two factors: (a) market
belief p that the firm is of the high type and (b) the amount of capital raised from the market
I − n, where n is accumulated cash within the firm. Because the cash flow arrival process is
Poisson, the security choice problem is stationary. Therefore, without loss of generality, we
solve for the optimal security conditional on issuing at time t = 0, with an arbitrary level of
accumulated cash n.
We proceed in two steps. The first step is to show that the renegotiation-proof require-
ment implies that payments to new security holders must be made on cash-flow arrival times.
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The second step is to solve for the division schedules {λj}, where λj is the fraction of the
j-th cash flow paid to the security holders, counting from the time of issuance.
Recall that any security in S has two kinds of payments: (i) those that happen on
deterministic dates and (ii) those that happen on (stochastic) dates of cash flow arrivals. If
the deterministic part of a renegotiation-proof security payments Sd were not zero, then there
would be a positive probability that the firm will not be able to make its promised payment
after a sufficiently long time without any cash flow arrival. Because of zero recovery value in
bankruptcy, an instant before the payment is due, the firm that has zero cash flow would be
able to successfully renegotiate the future payments by offering the market a security with
an arbitrary small value ε > 0 and avoid bankruptcy. Thus, any renegotiation-proof security
must pay only at the times of firm’s cash flow arrivals. The following lemma summarizes
this result.
Lemma 1 Security S ∈ S is renegotiation-proof only if Sd ≡ 0.
Although Lemma 1 does not fully characterize the set of renegotiation-proof securities
SRP , it shows that it is sufficient to consider securities that make payments only when the
firm receive cash flows (i.e., at times when dNt > 0). For all such securities the firm is
better off paying out all excess cash as dividends after the investment. Therefore, for every
renegotiation-proof security S ∈ SRP the value of shareholders immediately after the issuance
is given by
F θE(S) = E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rt(1− λNt)dNt
∣∣∣ θ] = µθ + k
r
− F θM(S), (11)
with
F θM(S) = E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rtλNtdNt
∣∣∣ θ] . (12)
The next lemma shows that a high type firm cannot use renegotiation-proof securities to
avoid pooling in equilibrium.
Lemma 2 No security S ∈ SRP can be used as a separating device.
Intuitively, any security that pays only at the times of cash flow arrivals is cheaper for the
low type firm due to a higher discounting of future payoffs. Since the average cost of issuing
a pooling security for both types is exactly I, the low type’s cost is strictly below I. By
issuing any other security different from the high type’s, the low type would reveal herself
and have to pay exactly I in present value terms. Thus, if the high type issues some security
S ∈ SRP at any point in time, the low type mimics.
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Given the previous lemma, any security S ∈ SRP issued by the high type induces pooling
in equilibrium. Since a fraction λj of the j-th cash flow is paid to new security holders, the
expected value of the security S is
pFHM (S) + (1− p)FLM(S) = p
∞∑
j=1
λj
(
µH + k
µH + k + r
)j
+ (1− p)
∞∑
j=1
λj
(
µL + k
µL + k + r
)j
, (13)
where p is the probability of a high type firm and(
µθ + k
µθ + k + r
)j
≡ qj(θ) (14)
is the present value of the j-th cash flow conditional on a type θ firm.
The following proposition characterizes a high type firm’s optimal security, simply re-
ferred to as the “optimal security.” This security incurs the smallest adverse selection cost
to a high type firm. Because the low type will imitate the high type, this security will be
the one issued in a pooling equilibrium.
Proposition 1 Suppose that the firm wishes to raise I − n from the market, whose belief
that the firm is of the high type is p. The security S∗(p, I − n) that maximizes payoff of the
original shareholders of a high type firm has the following structure. There exists a unique
positive integer J(p, I − n) such that
λj =
1, if j < J(p, I − n),0, if j > J(p, I − n), (15)
and J(p, I − n) and λJ(p,I−n) ∈ (0, 1] satisfy:
I − n = p
J(p,I−n)−1∑
j=1
qj(H) + λJ(p,I−n)qJ(p,I−n)(H)

+ (1− p)
J(p,I−n)−1∑
j=1
qj(L) + λJ(p,I−n)qJ(p,I−n)(L)
 . (16)
Obviously, the security S∗(p, I − n) of Proposition 1 is renegotiation-proof because the
firm’s cash flow arrivals are verifiable (and hence, the payments can be enforced in court).
Figure 3 illustrates the optimal security. Payments to outside security holders are front-
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Nt
1
λ1
1
λ2
2
. . . λJ(p,I−n)−1 λJ(p,I−n)
J(p, I − n)
λJ(p,I−n)+1 . . .
Figure 3: Payment schedule of the optimal security S∗(p, I − n).
loaded as much as possible, in the sense that the firm’s original shareholders never get paid
sooner than outside security holders. Intuitively, the ratio of the present values of the j-th
cash flow generated by the high type firm and the low type firm,(
µH + k
µH + k + r
)j/(
µL + k
µL + k + r
)j
=
qj(H)
qj(L)
, (17)
is increasing in j, since µH > µL. Therefore, later cash flows incur a higher adverse selection
cost for the high type firm, hence the desire to front-load payments. The fraction λj, j <
J(p, I − n), is capped at 100% since the firm cannot credibly pledge to pay more than 100%
of early cash flows. The total number of cash flows to outside security holders, J(p, I − n),
and the fraction of the last one, λJ(p,I−n), are determined by the break-even condition of the
market.
Using Proposition 1, we can define the pooling value of the original shareholders of a type
θ firm that has accumulated n units of cash internally and issues security S∗(p, I − n) to
finance the project as
Φθ(p, n) = F
θ
E(S
∗(p, I − n)) = µθ + k
r
− F θM(S∗(p, I − n))
=
µθ + k
r
−
J(p,I−n)−1∑
j=1
qj(θ)− λJ(p,I−n)qJ(p,I−n)(θ). (18)
Remark. The result of Proposition 1 is deeply connected to the findings of Nachman and
Noe (1994). To see this, write the value of the security S, conditional on type θ, as
F θE(S) = E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rtλNtdNt
∣∣∣ θ] = ∞∑
j=1
λj
(
µθ + k
µθ + k + r
)j
=
∞∑
j=1
λjqj(θ). (19)
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One can view Q(θ) = {qj(θ)}∞j=1 as a measure on N. Although Q(θ) is not a probability
measure, it inherits several useful properties from its probabilistic counterpart, the geomet-
ric distribution. For the sake of this exercise, it is important that the ratio qj(H)/qj(L) is
increasing in j, which implies strict conditional stochastic dominance for probability mea-
sures. Nachman and Noe (1994) and Fulghieri, Garcia, and Hackbarth (2015) show that
under conditional stochastic dominance, debt minimizes the cost of adverse selection and is
hence the optimal security. The security S∗(p, I−n) has properties similar to static debt: in
“low-cash-flow” states outside investors are paid first, and original shareholders receive the
residual cash flows.
Uniqueness. One can show that with additional restrictions on market beliefs, namely
(D1), pooling on security S∗(p, I − n) is the unique equilibrium of the issuance game at
t = 0. The proof follows Theorem 5 of Nachman and Noe (1994) and we omit it for brevity.
4 Optimal Timing of Issuing the Optimal Security
In the previous section we have solved the optimal security conditional on the firm’s issuing
decision. In this section we solve the optimal timing of issuing the optimal security. The
unique feature of the dynamic model with cash flow accumulation is that the arrival of cash
flows changes market belief and internal cash reserve simultaneously.
4.1 Market Belief
To explore the evolution of market belief, note that the market revises its belief based on two
sources of information: publicly available cash flows and equilibrium investment strategies.
The former gives rise to the non-strategic component of the belief process, while the latter
gives rise to the strategic (signaling) one. To disentangle these two components, as well as
to simplify exposition, we introduce an auxiliary belief process pˆt, defined as:
pˆt = P(θ = H | FNt ). (20)
The process pˆt is the probability of facing a high type firm, conditional only on the observed
cash flows up to time t. In other words, pˆt represents the non-strategic component of the
belief process.
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It is convenient to work in the log-likelihood space zˆt = ln
(
pˆt
1−pˆt
)
. Because the number
of cash flows that have arrived by time t for the type θ firm is Poisson distributed with
parameter µθt, we have
zˆt = ln
(
p0
1− p0
1
Nt
exp(−µHt)(µHt)Nt
1
Nt
exp(−µLt)(µLt)Nt
)
= ln
(
p0
1− p0
)
+Nt ln(µH/µL)− (µH − µL)t. (21)
Letting
∆ = ln(µH/µL) > 0, (22)
we see that zˆt evolves according to
dzˆt = −(µH − µL)dt+ ∆dNt. (23)
That is, the non-strategic component of the market belief drifts down at a deterministic rate
and jumps up whenever a cash flow arrives. A sample path of non-strategic belief component
zˆt is shown in Figure 4. Since there is a one-to-one, monotone increasing mapping between
pˆ and zˆ, we refer to both of them as “belief.”
t
zˆt
∆
Figure 4: Sample path of the non-strategic belief component zˆt.
To demonstrate the effect of the second, strategic, source of information, define zt as
zt = ln
(
pt
1−pt
)
. Then, applying the Bayes rule we can decompose belief zt into:
8
zt = zˆt + ln
(
1− piHt−
1− piLt−
)
. (24)
The second term in (24) captures the pure signaling effect on the market’s belief. For
example, if piHt− < pi
L
t−, then the absence of issuance before time t is a positive signal of the
8We denote by piθt− the right limit of pi
θ at t, i.e., piθt− = limu↑t pi
θ
u.
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firm’s quality.
The non-strategic component of market belief process, zˆt, does not depend on the firm’s
type. The firm, however, knows its type, and the manager observes the “true” belief process
zˆt, denoted zˆ
θ
t . Separating the martingale component in (23), we can write:
dzˆHt = µH∆dt− (µH − µL)dt+ ∆(dNt − µHdt), (25)
dzˆLt = µL∆dt− (µH − µL)dt+ ∆(dNt − µLdt), (26)
Path by path, zˆt coincides with zˆ
H
t if the firm is of the high type, and it coincides with zˆ
L
t
if the firm is of the low type. At any instance s, the market’s conditional distribution of
future realizations of zˆt, t > s, is given by (23), the high type’s corresponding distribution
of zˆHt is given by (25), and the low type’s conditional distribution of zˆ
L
t is given by (26).
This difference in the assessment of future conditional distributions is the essential source of
dynamic information asymmetry.
4.2 Preliminary Steps
In this subsection we lay down a few preliminary steps towards a full analysis of the optimal
timing of issuance. We begin by highlighting the properties that any equilibrium of the
dynamic game possesses.
Lemma 3 In any equilibrium in which the high type plays a pure strategy, investment hap-
pens only after one of the following events:
1. (Pooling) The firm raises I −Nt by issuing S∗(pt, I −Nt);
2. (Separating) The firm raises I −Nt by issuing a security different from S∗(pt, I −Nt);
3. (Investment with cash) The firm accumulates Nt = I units of cash and invests only
using cash.
This lemma summaries the “skimming” property of any equilibrium: along any equilib-
rium path that involves issuance of securities the low type firm either separates by issuing a
security at a low price on an early date in expectation, or pools with the high type firm on
a later date in expectation.
The intuition behind Lemma 3 relies on the fact that waiting is more costly for the low
type firm than for the high type. The cost differential stems from two sources: information
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arrival and cash accumulation, which are linked in our model. Over time, the firm accumu-
lates internal cash and the need for external financing is reduced. Thus, the low type firm’s
expected benefits of issuing overpriced securities go down. Moreover, since µH > µL, the low
type expects the future market beliefs (and corresponding security prices) to be below the
expectations of the high type, and as a result the low type is more likely to issue earlier.
More subtly, the restriction that the high type plays a pure strategy pins down the pooling
security to be S∗(pt, I − Nt), where pt is the current market belief. Indeed, in the unique
equilibrium that satisfies a set of refinements discussed in Section 4.4, the high type plays a
pure strategy, given explicitly in the next subsection.
Given Lemma 3, we conjecture that the equilibrium consists of the following regions in
terms of the state variables (zt, Nt): the separating region ΩM , the pooling region ΩP , and
the waiting region ΩW . The first two of these regions are characterized by the following
conditions:9
VH(t) = ΦH(zt, Nt) (zt, Nt) ∈ ΩP , (27)
VL(t) =
µL + k
r
− I (zt, Nt) ∈ ΩS. (28)
In other words, the high type is willing to pool only if the continuation value from of waiting
VH(t) is exactly equal to the expected value from pooling ΦH(zt, Nt). Similarly, if the low
type firm were to issue a security at a price revealing its type, it has to be indifferent between
doing so and receiving the continuation value.
In the waiting region (if it is not degenerate) the value functions Vθ(t) are function of
two state variables, market belief z and accumulated cash flows n, and satisfy the following
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations for (z, n) ∈ ΩW :(r + µH)VH(z, n) = µHVH(z + ∆, n+ 1)− (µH − µL) ∂∂zVH(z, n),(r + µL)VL(z, n) = µLVL(z + ∆, n+ 1) − (µH − µL) ∂∂zVL(z, n). (29)
The HJB equation reflects the fact that in the next dt interval of time the next unit of cash
flow arrives with intensity µθ, in which case the market belief jumps up by ∆ and the firm’s
payoff changes by Vθ(z + ∆, n + 1) − Vθ(z, n). If the cash flow does not arrive, the waiting
payoff is discounted by −rVθ(z, n) and further decreases due to a downward drift of market
belief by −(µH − µL) ∂∂zVθ(z, n).
9We convert beliefs into the loglikelihood space and with a slight abuse of notation write Φθ(z, n).
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In order to characterize the equilibrium, we solve equations (29) with endogenous bound-
ary conditions (27) and (28).
4.3 Dynamic Equilibrium
For any market belief zt and internal cash Nt, we define the pooling price to be
ezt
ezt + 1
FHM (S
∗(zt, I −Nt)) + 1
ezt + 1
FLM(S
∗(zt, I −Nt)), (30)
and we let the separating price be FLM(S
∗(−∞, I − Nt)). The next two propositions char-
acterize the equilibrium issuance strategies of the firm and market prices. Proposition 2
(Proposition 3) applies to situations with relatively low (high) levels of cash accumulation
within the firm.
Proposition 2 (Two-threshold case) The equilibrium is characterized by a series of thresh-
olds {(z(n), z(n))}In=0 and a cutoff n∗. Let n be the amount of cash that the firm has accu-
mulated up to time t. Then, for n ≤ n∗, the equilibrium has the following shape:
1. The thresholds z(n) and z(n) are given by equations (49) and (52) in Appendix B.4.
Moreover, z(n) < z(n).
2. The market offers the separating price if z < z(n) and the pooling price if z ≥ z(n). If
z0 = z(0), the probability that the market makes a pooling offer at t = 0 is arbitrary.
3. A high type firm issues at the pooling price whenever z ≥ z(n) and a pooling price is
offered. It does not issue otherwise. The high type firm’s value function VH(z, n) is
given by equation (53) in Appendix B.4.
4. A low type firm issues for sure if any pooling price is offered. If only the separating
price is offered and z < z(n), it mixes at the separating price with the acceptance
probability 1 − ez−z(n). If only the separating price is offered and z = z(n), it mixes
at the separating price with the rate of acceptance µH − µL. The low type firm’s value
function VL(z, n) is given by equation (55) in Appendix B.4.
The equilibrium described in Proposition 2 applies to situations with relatively low level
of internal cash, since it requires n ≤ n∗. Figure 5 shows a sample path of market belief z
with corresponding lower and upper equilibrium thresholds (z(n), z(n)).
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Figure 5: Sample path of market belief process zt with equilibrium thresholds (z(n), z(n))
2
n=0.
When the market’s belief reaches the upper threshold z(n) (i.e., when outside investors
become sufficiently optimistic about the firm’s quality), both types invest by issuing S∗(z, I−
n) at a pooling price. The upper threshold z(n) is essentially chosen by a high type firm
that trades off a higher current adverse selection cost against the time value of delaying
investment in a positive NPV project.
When the market’s belief reaches z(n), only a low type firm issues. By part 4 of Propo-
sition 2, it does so probabilistically. The lower threshold is chosen so that a low type firm
is indifferent between investing now (and thus revealing its type) and postponing investing
with the hope that positive cash flow shocks would lead the market’s belief to hit the upper
threshold z in the future. The equilibrium rate of mixing by a low type firm at the lower
threshold forces the beliefs to be reflecting. That is, conditional on not observing issuance
at z(n), the market’s belief immediately adjusts upwards, because a high type firm would
never invest at the low threshold. The exact rate of separation by the low type firm exactly
offsets the downward drift in the market beliefs and results in a belief process that never
falls below z(n), i.e. conditional on no issuance:
dzt =

−(µH − µL)dt+ ∆dNt, if zt > z(Nt),
∆dNt, if zt = z(Nt),
z(Nt)− zt, if zt < z(Nt).
(31)
For all the market belief levels between the two thresholds, z(n) and z(n), there is a
region of optimal inaction in which both firm types postpone their decisions. A high type
firm expects more cash flow arrivals, which reduce both underpricing per unit of capital raised
and the amount external capital needed. A low type firm “speculates” on positive shocks
to its cash flows and higher overpricing of its (yet to be issued) securities, even though new
cash flow arrivals will reduce the amount of external financing. The dynamic lemons model
of Daley and Green (2012) only captures the channel that cash flows convey information,
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but our model additionally captures the channel that cash flows also reduce the required
outside financing.
Figure 6 shows the shapes of the continuation values VH(z, n) and VL(z, n) as functions
of z. If the market belief is below the threshold z(n), the mixing strategy of the low type
guarantees that the belief jumps immediately to z(n) and stays there until a new cash flow
arrives. This implies that VH(z, n) and VL(z, n) do not change below z(n), hence the flat
parts of the graphs. Given the low type’s mixed strategies, the lower threshold z(n) is also a
“waiting point” where the firm spends a positive amount of time in expectation until a new
cash flow arrives.
z
V
separate wait
wait
pool
z(n) z(n)
VL(z, n)
ΦL(z, n)
(a) Low type’s value function VL(z, n)
z
V
wait
wait
wait pool
z(n) z(n)
VH(z, n)
ΦH(z, n)
(b) High type’s value function VL(z, n)
Figure 6: Equilibrium value functions for n such that z(n) > z(n)
In the waiting region, the value functions increase in z because more favorable market
beliefs imply higher market prices of securities issued in the future. At the upper threshold
z(n) the continuation value VL(z, n) is generally discontinuous. This discontinuity comes
from the model feature that cash flows are lumpy. Intuitively, just above z(n) a low type
firm issues at the pooling price; just below z(n) the best a low type firm can do is to wait
until a new cash flow arrives, but waiting for the new cash flow incurs the cost of time
value of money and reduces the expected profit from selling overpriced securities. Hence the
discrete jump of VL(z, n) as z crosses z(n). The high type’s continuation value VH(z, n) is
continuous at z(n) because it is the high type’s incentive conditions that determines this
upper threshold in equilibrium.
The next proposition shows that if internal cash is sufficiently high, the waiting region
collapses to a single point, i.e. z(n) = z(n).
Proposition 3 (One-threshold case) The equilibrium is characterized by a series of thresh-
olds {(z(n), z(n))}In=0 and a cutoff n∗. Let n be the amount of cash that the firm has accu-
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mulated up to time t. Then, for n > n∗, the equilibrium has the following shape:
1. z(n) = z(n).
2. The market offers the separating price if z < z(n), offers the pooling price if z > z(n),
and mixes between the separating price and pooling price if z = z(n) such that at any
time t > 0 the pooling price arrives with intensity δ(n) that solves
µL + k
r
− n = δ(n)
µL + δ(n) + r
ΦL(z(n), n) +
µL
µL + δ(n) + r
VL(z(n) + ∆, n+ 1), (32)
where VL is given by Part 4 below. If z0 = z(0), the probability that the market makes
a pooling offer at t = 0 is arbitrary.
3. A high type firm issues at the pooling price whenever z ≥ z(n) and a pooling price is
offered. It does not issue otherwise. The high type firm’s value function VH(z, n) is
given by
VH(z, n) =
ΦH(z, n), z > z(n)ΦH(z(n), n), z ≤ z(n) . (33)
4. A low type firm issues for sure if any pooling price is offered. If only the separating
price is offered and z < z(n), it mixes at the separating price with the acceptance
probability 1 − ez−z(n). If only the separating price is offered and z = z(n), it mixes
at the separating price with the rate of acceptance µH − µL. The low type firm’s value
function VL(z, n) is given by
VL(z, n) =
ΦL(z, n), z > z(n)µL+k
r
− n, z ≤ z(n)
. (34)
Figure 7 illustrates the shapes of the equilibrium value functions VL(z, n) and VH(z, n)
as functions of market belief z for the one-threshold case of Proposition 3. The equilibrium
has a few notable properties. First, similar to the two-threshold case, partial revelation of
the low type firm implies that VH(z, n) and VL(z, n) do not change below z(n), hence the
flat parts of the graphs.
Second, due to the mixed strategy played by the market at z(n), there is strictly positive
waiting time at z(n) before a pooling price is offered. If the waiting time at z(n) were zero,
then the low type would reject the separating offer for sure below z(n); this implies that the
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Figure 7: Equilibrium value functions for n such that z(n) = z(n)
market belief cannot jump up, which would defeat the purpose of rejecting separating offers
below z(n) to start with. This waiting point is highlighted in Figure 7.
Third, the low-type firm’s value function is generally discontinuous at z(n). Such dis-
continuity is incentive-compatible in equilibrium because the waiting time at z(n) is strictly
positive with probability 1. Similarly, while the high-type firm’s value function is continuous
at z(n), it has a kink at z(n), and this kink is incentive-compatible also because of a positive
waiting time at z. In diffusion-based models such as Daley and Green (2012), waiting time
at any particular belief is zero with probability 1; hence, in these models value functions
must be continuous and have continuous first derivatives.
Example. To further illustrate the intuition, Figure 8 plots the numerical solutions of
the belief thresholds for I = 6. In this plot we have converted all log-likelihood (“z”)
variables to probabilities (“p”) using p = ez/(ez + 1). The horizontal axis is the cash already
accumulated, n, and the vertical axis is the belief variables. In this example, if n ∈ {0, 1},
the two-threshold case of Proposition 2 applies. In this case p(n) < p(n). If n ≥ 2, the single
threshold case of Proposition 3 applies, and p = p.
In both cases (two thresholds and one threshold), p is decreasing in n, implying that
the high-type firm is more willing to pool because the expected adverse selection cost is
smaller. Simultaneously, the low type faces two countervailing incentives. On one hand,
waiting becomes more attractive for the low type because the high type is more willing to
pool. On the other hand, more internal cash also means a lower benefit of pooling for the
low type, so the low type firm is more willing to separate. These two effects generate a lower
threshold p that is generally non-monotone in n.
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Figure 8: Equilibrium belief thresholds as functions of internal cash level. We convert
log-likelihood variables to probabilities by p = ez/(ez + 1). Parameters: I = 6, µH = 3.5,
µL = 1.5, r = 0.07, and k = 0.45.
4.4 A Brief Discussion of Equilibrium Selection
Dynamic games typically have multiple equilibria. In our model, this multiplicity problem is
amplified by the presence of asymmetric information. Therefore, characterizing all possible
perfect equilibria is infeasible. Instead, we show that the equilibrium of Propositions 2 and
3 is unique under the following three restrictions. We will briefly describe their intuition and
leave formal discussions to the appendix.
First, due to the lack of mathematical apparatus to deal with arbitrary path-dependent
strategies, we restrict attention to stationary strategies only, i.e., the strategies do not depend
explicitly on t.10 In the current setting, this restriction is natural because the dynamics of
our model are driven by the time-homogeneous Poisson cash flow process {Nt}t≥0.
Second, we require beliefs to be monotone non-decreasing, which means that zt − zˆt is
a non-decreasing process in t, where recall zt is the market belief and zˆt is the component
of zt that only depends on the cash flows. This refinement is a natural extension of the
Divinity refinement of Banks and Sobel (1987) to the continuous-time setting and has been
used by Daley and Green (2012) and Gul and Pesendorfer (2012). This restriction allows us
10Although we confine the strategies used in the construction of equilibrium to be stationary, we place no
restrictions on the set of deviations. In particular, equilibria derived in Propositions 2 and 3 survive against
arbitrary non-stationary deviations.
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to rule out potential unreasonable equilibria in which the market forces a particular timing
of issuance by “threatening” that a failure to issue will always be attributed to the low type.
Finally, we focus only on equilibria in which the value functions of the two types of
firm are monotone non-decreasing in market belief and satisfy the “No Deals” condition.
Monotonicity rules out equilibria in which the low type firm has incentives to “sabotage”,
i.e., decrease the market belief and still receive a higher payoff. The No Deals condition was
first introduced by Daley and Green (2012) to capture in a reduced-form “private offers”
of Swinkels (1999). (See Definition 4 in Appendix for details.) The No Deals condition
precludes the existence of off-equilibrium prices at which the firm would like to issue and the
market would earn positive profits.
The next proposition provides sufficient conditions for our equilibrium to be the unique
one.
Proposition 4 (Equilibrium Uniqueness) For a sufficiently small µL, the equilibrium
of Propositions 2 and 3 is the unique equilibrium that has: (i) stationary strategies, (ii)
monotone non-decreasing beliefs, and (iii) non-decreasing value functions satisfying the No
Deals condition.
Instead of proving Proposition 4 directly, we refer readers to Daley and Green (2012)’s
Theorem 5.1. Using essentially the same technique, one could use backward induction on
the amount of internal cash n to show that the uniqueness of the equilibrium in their model
implies the uniqueness of the equilibrium in Propositions 2 and 3. The additional difficulty in
our analysis arises because the Static Lemons condition of Daley and Green (2012) eventually
and inevitably stops binding as the firm accumulates more cash in equilibrium. As a result,
additional care needs to be taken to make sure that the No Deals condition is satisfied for
all n. While the uniqueness proof is similar, we stress that our model goes beyond Daley
and Green (2012) in allowing cash flow accumulation and characterizing the optimal security
(under certain restrictions).
5 Empirical Implications
Our results generate a number of empirical implications.
First, our model predicts that issuance and investment can take place after a series of
lower-than-expected cash flows. Such behavior arises because of the separation by the low
type firm at the lower reflecting threshold z(n).
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Second, related to the previous prediction, if issuance happens after low realized cash
flows, the new issuance immediately leads to a drop on firm value because the firm is revealed
to be of the low type. By contrast, if issuance happens after high realized cash flows, the firm
value remains a martingale because this kind of issuance happens in a pooling equilibrium.
Third, unconditionally, the high type firm accumulates more cash prior to investment
than the low type does. This is because the high type firm only invests in the pooling
region, whereas the low type firm invests in both pooling and separation regions. That is, if
a higher fraction of a firm’s investment is financed by internal cash (retained earnings), the
firm’s subsequent return is higher.
Fourth, conditional on issuance happening after low realized cash flows, the magnitude
of the drop in firm value can be non-monotone in the level of internal cash reserve. This is
because the lower threshold z(n) is generally non-monotone in n. Thus, it is possible that a
firm with a higher internal cash reserve experiences a larger drop in value.
6 Concluding Remarks
When a firm is financially constrained, asymmetric information is an impediment to outside
financing and hence investment. This paper characterizes equilibrium behavior of the firm
when the firm’s assets in place generate cash flows that both reveal the firm’s quality and
relax its financial constraint. We show conditions under which the firm optimally delays
issuance and investment. Moreover, under stated assumptions, the renegotiation-proof op-
timal security (of the high-quality firm) front-loads cash flows to outside investors in order
to minimize adverse selection cost.
One possible extension for future work is to broaden the class of possible securities. For
securities considered in our model, the split of cash flows between outside investors and
original shareholders are determined upfront and cannot depend on future events that are
yet to realize. Relaxing this assumption is likely to further reduce the adverse selection cost,
but we do not expect it to eliminate the adverse selection problem altogether. For example,
one can consider a credit line with face value I that grows at rate r and can be paid back by
the firm at any point in the future.11 A credit line is not in the class of securities we consider
in this paper because the repayment schedule is not specified upfront but is determined by
the firm in real time. For example, if cash flows arrive later than expected, then it would
take longer to repay the growing balance. In Appendix C we show that the credit line does
11We thank Peter DeMarzo for suggesting this security.
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not eliminate the adverse selection problem. Thus, our solution method of optimal issuance
timing can also be applied to the credit line, and we expect the results to be qualitatively
similar to that in Propositions 2 and 3. It remains an interesting question whether the credit
line is the optimal security design under a broader class of securities, and if not, what is the
optimal security. We have not found a tractable method of solving this problem.
Another possible extension of our model is to allow more flexible use of accumulated cash.
Share repurchases analyzed by Bond and Zhong (2016) is one example. Other examples
include paying dividends, burning cash, and buying and selling other derivatives contracts
in the open markets as signals of firm quality. Since there are virtually unlimited number
of such choices, analyzing flexible use of cash is an intractable problem for solution methods
we are aware of.
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Appendix
A A Glossary of Main Model Variables
This appendix summarizes the main model variables used in this paper.
Variable Explanation
µθ Type θ firm’s mean cash flow arrival rate is µθ
Nt The number of cash flows that arrive by time t
k Incremental arrival rate of cash flows brought by the new project
r Discount rate
I Required amount of funds to undertake the investment
S The class of securities we consider
SRP Renegation-proof securities; a subset of S
S A generic security, whose cumulative payment up to time t is denoted St
λm The fraction of the m-th cash flow paid to outside investors
piθt The cumulative probability of issuance by type θ up to time t
Dt The cumulative dividend paid to shareholders up to time t
Ct The amount of cash saved within the firm by time t
F θE(S) The original shareholders’ value given security S and type θ
F θM(S) The market value of security S conditional on type θ
M(S) The market price of the security S, M(S) ∈ {E[F θM(S)], FLM(S)}
p The market belief that the firm is of the high type
z Likelihood ratio, z = ln(p/1− p)
pˆ, zˆ Market belief based only on cash flows and not on past issuance decisions
VH(t) = VH(zt, Nt) The high type firm’s value function at time t
VL(t) = VL(zt, Nt) The low type firm’s value function at time t
J(p, I − n) In the optimal security, original shareholders start to get paid from the
J(p, I − n)-th cash flow
S∗(p, I − n) The optimal security issued if market belief is p and internal cash is n
Φθ(p, n), Φθ(z, n) Value of pooling immediately for type θ if belief is p or z, and internal
cash is n
∆ ln(µH/µL), the upward jump in belief z after a cash flow arrives
z(n), z(n) The lower and upper belief thresholds, if internal cash is n
δ(n) The intensity that the market proposes the pooling price, if internal cash
is n
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B Proofs
B.1 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Suppose that a high type firm issues some security S. The payoff to a low type firm
from mimicking the high type and issuing the same security S is
FLE (S) =
µθ + k
r
− FLM(S). (35)
Because security S is priced by a competitive market that breaks even in expectation, we
have
pFHM (S) + (1− p)FLM(S) = I ⇒ FHM (S) > I > FLM(S). (36)
Hence a low type firm’s payoff from pooling,
FLE (S) =
µθ + k
r
− FLM(S) >
µθ + k
r
− I = µθ + k
r
− FLM(S˜), (37)
is higher than the payoff from issuing a security S˜ that separates a low type firm.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. We look for security S∗(p, I − n) that solves
S∗(p, I − n) = argmaxS∈SRP FHE (S), s.t. pFHM (S) + (1− p)FLM(S) = I. (38)
The main argument of the proof is to establish that the optimal security should front-load
payments as much as possible, in order to reduce adverse-selection costs.
Suppose, for simplicity, that the firm wishes to raise a small quantity of cash ε from the
market. Consider a security S1 such that λ1j = 0 for all j 6= 1 but λ11 6= 0. The first payment
λ11 solves
λ11
(
p
µH + k
µH + k + r
+ (1− p) µL + k
µL + k + r
)
= ε. (39)
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The corresponding equity value of a high type firm is
FHE (S
1) =
µH + k
r
− FHM (S1)
=
µH + k
r
− µH + k
µH + k + r
λ11
=
µH + k
r
− ε
p+ (1− p) · µL+k
µL+k+r
· µH+k+r
µH+k
.
Alternatively, consider a security S2 such that λ2j = 0 for all j 6= 2 but λ22 6= 0. Analogous
calculations reveal that
FHE (S
2) =
µH + k
r
− ε
p+ (1− p) ·
(
µL+k
µL+k+r
· µH+k+r
µH+k
)2 . (40)
Since µL+k
µL+k+r
· µH+k+r
µH+k
< 1, we have
FHE (S
1) > FHE (S
2). (41)
That is, a high type firm prefers S1 to S2.
The above argument implies that if λ1 < 1 and λ2 > 0 for any security, a high type firm
can strictly profit by moving  > 0 promised payment from the second cash flow time to the
first.
Repeating this argument for subsequent cash flow times, we can see that the security
cannot be optimal if λm < 1 but λn > 0 for n > m. Thus, the unique optimal security has
absolute priority in allocating the cash flows: the original shareholders receive nothing until
the outside security holder receives all their promised payments. This optimal security is
precisely the one stated in the proposition.
Explicit calculations show that
J(p, I − n) = min
{
J :
J∑
j=1
[
p
(
µH + k
µH + k + r
)j
+ (1− p)
(
µL + k
µL + k + r
)j]
≥ I
}
, (42)
and
λJ(p,I−n) =
I −∑J(p,I−n)−1j=1 [p( µH+kµH+k+r)j + (1− p)( µL+kµL+k+r)j
]
p
(
µH+k
µH+k+r
)J(p,I−n)
+ (1− p)
(
µL+k
µL+k+r
)J(p,I−n) . (43)
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B.3 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. Denote by Vθ(t) continuation value of the type θ at time t. Notice that Vθ(t) is
an FN -adapted process, so it can be written as Vθ(zt, Nt). It is clear that if there exists a
security at time t, St, and a market price Vt(St) such that (µθ + k)/r − F θS(St) > Vθ(zt, Nt),
it is optimal for the firm to issue and invest rather than wait and receive Vθ(zt, Nt). That it,
each firm follows a threshold strategy.
Next we show that if the high type firm is willing to issue a security S at time t, then so
does the low type firm, i.e.
if FHE (S) > VH(zt, Nt) then F
L
E (S) > VL(zt, Nt)
Suppose that in the continuation game the high type will issue a security S˜ at time τ ,
then
FLE (S) = F
L
E (S) + F
H
E (S)− FHE (S) > FLE (S) + EH [e−rτFHE (S˜)]− FHE (S)
= FLE (S)− EL[e−rτFLE (S)] + EL[e−rτ (FLE (S)− FLE (S˜))]
− FHE (S) + EH [e−rτFHE (S)]− EH [e−rτ (FHE (S)− FHE (S˜))] + EL[e−rτFLE (S˜)]
> FLE (S)− EL[e−rτFLE (S)]
− FHE (S) + EH [e−rτFHE (S)] + EL[e−rτFLE (S˜)]
> EL[e−rτFLE (S˜)].
In the above derivation, the first inequality is due to the assumption that the high type
would rather issue S now than issue S˜ at τ . The second inequality is due to the fact that
a security S˜ − S is more valuable if issued by the high type. And the final inequality holds
since the high type’s cash flows arrive faster; thus, he loses less by waiting until τ to issue
S. Therefore, the low type would also prefer to issue S immediately.
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B.4 Proof of Propositions 2 and 3
Preliminary steps.
Consider an auxiliary function WH(z, n), defined by:
WH(z, n) = ΦH(z, n)− µH
µH + r
ΦH(z + ∆, n+ 1), (44)
zH(n) ≡ sup{z : WH(z, n) < 0} with sup{∅} = −∞. (45)
The second term on the right-hand side of the definition of WH(z, n) is a high type firm’s
expected discounted value of issuing the optimal security after a new cash flow, conditional
on the market belief staying at z in the mean time. Intuitively, if WH(z, n) < 0, then the high
type prefers to raise funds I−n and invest immediately rather than wait for the arrival of the
next cash flow. For sufficiently high z, the function WH(z, n) is always positive. Therefore,
zH(n) is the upper bound on the size of the waiting region.
Similarly, define an auxiliary function WL(z, n) and its root zL(n) by:
WL(z, n) =
µL + k
r
− (I − n)− µL
µL + k
ΦL(z + ∆, n+ 1), (46)
zL(n) = inf{z : WL(z, n) < 0} with inf{∅} =∞. (47)
If WL(z, n) > 0, then a low type firm would reveal its type immediately and capture the
positive NPV of the project, rather than wait in hopes of pooling in the future. Since in any
equilibrium the payoff of a low type firm is no greater than the pooling value ΦL(z, n), the
threshold zL(n) is the lower bound of the waiting region.
The following lemma characterizes the behavior of the auxiliary thresholds zH(n) and
zL(n) for various level of internal cash n.
Lemma 4 zH(n) is decreasing in n and zL(n) is increasing in n.
Proof. First, notice that Φθ(z, n) is an increasing function of z regardless of θ and n. Thus,
WL(z, n) is decreasing in z. Second, notice that ΦL(z, n) is decreasing in n. Hence,
WL(z, n)−WL(z, n− 1) = 1 + µL
µL + r
[ΦL(z + ∆, n)− ΦL(z + ∆, n+ 1)] > 0. (48)
Since WL(z, n) is increasing in n, the unique root zL(n) is also increasing in n.
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Now consider WH(z, n):
WH(z, n− 1)−WH(z, n) = ΦH(z, n− 1)− µH
µH + r
ΦH(z + ∆, n)
− ΦH(z, n) + µH
µH + r
ΦH(z + ∆, n+ 1)
= ΦH(z, n− 1)− ΦH(z, n) + µH
µH + r
[ΦH(z + ∆, n+ 1)− ΦH(z + ∆, n)]
> ΦH(z, n)− ΦH(z, n+ 1) + µH
µH + r
[ΦH(z + ∆, n+ 1)− ΦH(z + ∆, n)]
> ΦH(z + ∆, n)− ΦH(z + ∆, n+ 1)
+
µH
µH + r
[ΦH(z + ∆, n+ 1)− ΦH(z + ∆, n)]
=
r
µH + r
[
ΦH(z + ∆, n)− ΦH(z + ∆, n+ 1)
]
> 0.
Here, the first inequality holds because ΦH(z, n−1)−ΦH(z, n) is decreasing in n, the second
inequality holds because ΦH(z, n)− ΦH(z, n + 1) is decreasing in z, and the last inequality
holds because ΦH(z, n) is increasing in n. Thus, the function WH(z, n) is increasing in n and
the right-most root zH(n) is decreasing in n.
Proof of Propositions 2 and 3.
Case n = I − 1. First, notice that zL(I − 1) = +∞ since after the arrival of the final cash
flow the project will be financed internally and the low type firm can not benefit from issuing
overpriced security. Thus, z(I − 1) = z(I − 1) = zH(I − 1). We now verify the strategies
given the belief threshold z(I − 1) and mixing intensity δ(I − 1) at z(I − 1). As usual, when
verifying each player’s strategy, we hold the other players’ strategies fixed.
1. High-type firm’s strategy. At the belief threshold z(I − 1), the high type firm is
indifferent between pooling immediately and waiting. Below z(I − 1), rejecting the
separating offers is optimal since belief jumps up to z(I−1) immediately. Above z(I−1)
accepting the pooling is optimal, since beliefs have a downward drift µH − µL; thus,
the continuation value of rejecting a pooling offer is strictly below µH
µH+r
ΦH(z + ∆, I),
which in turn is less than ΦH(z, I − 1).
2. Low-type firm’s strategy. It is clear that the low type firm should accept a pooling price
immediately. But the low type firm cannot accept a separating offer with probability
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1, for otherwise the market belief zt would jump to ∞ immediately afterwards, which
means the low type firm would wish to delay instead.
Nor could the low type firm reject the separating offer with probability 1, for otherwise
the market belief would deteriorate over time, which defeats the purpose of rejecting
the separating offer. Thus, the low-type firm always mixes at the separating price.
The mixing probability must be such that the resulting market belief is z(I − 1), for
the following reason. If the resulting market belief were strictly below z(I − 1), the
market would not offer a pooling price. If the resulting market belief were strictly
above z(I − 1), then immediate pooling would follow, which implies that the low type
firm would reject the separating offer for sure.
The above logic implies that the market belief must stay at z(I−1) without a new cash
flow. If zt < z(I − 1), the probability that the low-type firm accepts the separating
offer must be 1− ezt−z(I−1), for this implies that the new market belief after rejecting
the separating offer is
zt + log
(
1
ezt−z(I−1)
)
= z(I − 1).
If zt = z(I − 1), the mixing probability must be such that the resulting belief remains
at z(I−1). A mixing strategy that involves accepting a separating offer at rate µH−µL
implies that the signaling component of market belief has a drift of
log
P(delay by dt | high type)
P(delay by dt | low type) = log
1
1− (µH − µL)dt ≈ (µH − µL)dt.
This approximation is exact in continuous time and exactly offsets the downward drift
of market belief at rate µH − µL without a new cash flow.
Case n < I − 1. Next we construct the equilibrium by induction. If n < I − 1 but
zH(n) ≤ zL(n), the equilibrium with a single belief threshold can be constructed in a similar
way as in the n = I − 1 case above.
For the rest of the proof we focus on n’s such that zH(n) > zL(n). Since zH(n) is
decreasing in n and zL(n) is increasing, there exists an n
∗ such that for all n < n∗, zH(n) >
zL(n). That is, the ordering between zH(n) and zL(n) never changes as we decrease n from
n∗.
For n < n∗, we conjecture the following equilibrium structure: there exist two distinct
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thresholds z(n) < z(n) and continuation values VH(z, n) and VL(z, n) such that
z ≥ z(n)⇒ VH(z, n) = ΦH(z, n), VL(z, n) = ΦL(z, n), (Pooling)
z ∈ (z(n), z(n))⇒ VL(z, n) < ΦL(z, n), (Waiting)
z ≤ z(n)⇒ VH(z, n) = VH(z(n), n), VL(z, n) = µL + k
r
− (I − n). (Separating)
We now proceed with the induction step of going from n to n − 1, with VH(·, n) and
VL(·, n) already constructed from step n.
Define z(n− 1) to be the solution of
µL + k
r
− (n− 1) = µL
µL + r
VL(z(n− 1) + ∆, n). (49)
Note that z(n− 1) + ∆ > z(n) because
µL + k
r
− (I − (n− 1)) > µL
µL + r
(
µL + k
r
− (I − n)
)
=
µL
µL + r
VL(z(n), n),
i.e., the low type prefers separating now to separating after one cash flow by the time value
of money.
This leaves us with two cases: z(n − 1) + ∆ ∈ (z(n), z(n)] or z(n − 1) + ∆ > z(n). We
show below that at z(n − 1) the high type prefers to wait, since at z(n − 1) only the low
price (corresponding to belief p = 0 or z = −∞) is offered. This boils down to showing that
ΦH(−∞, n− 1) ≤ µH
µH + r
VH(z(n− 1) + ∆, n).
This is true due to the skimming property. Suppose the contrary, i.e. that the high type
strictly prefers to take the low price, then
ΦH(−∞, n− 1) > µH
µH + r
VH(z(n− 1) + ∆, n),
which implies
ΦL(−∞, n− 1) > µH
µH + r
VL(z(n− 1) + ∆, n).
Thus,
µL + k
r
− (n− 1) = ΦL(−∞, n− 1) > µL
µL + r
VL(z(n− 1) + ∆, n).
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The last inequality contradicts the definition of z(n − 1). Hence, the initial conjecture
that the high type strictly prefers to accept the low price is false. Overall, the high type
prefers to wait at z(n− 1).
Having constructed z(n − 1), we construct z(n − 1). Define an auxiliary function H(z)
by:
H(z) = E
[
e−rτVH(zτ + ∆, n) | z0 = z
]
, (50)
where τ is the arrival time of a new cash flow from a Poisson process with intensity µH and
zt evolves as
dzt =
−(µH − µL)dt, if zt ≥ z(n− 1),0, if zt = z(n− 1). (51)
Since VH(·, n) has been constructed recursively already (induction step), H can be eval-
uated by integration. We define z(n− 1) to be the maximal solution of
ΦH(z(n− 1), n− 1) = H(z(n− 1)). (52)
If the equation above has no solution, then put z(n− 1) = +∞. Thus, the high type’s value
function VH(z, n− 1) can be constructed as:
VH(z, n− 1) =

ΦH(z, n− 1), z ≥ z(n− 1)
H(z), z ∈ (z(n− 1), z(n− 1)),
µH
µH+r
VH(z(n− 1) + ∆, n), z ≤ z(n− 1).
(53)
In the last case of z ≤ z(n− 1), note that even if z < z(n− 1), the market belief jumps to
z(n− 1) immediately conditional on no investment. Thus, the high type’s value is equal to
µH
µH+r
VH(z(n− 1) + ∆, n).
The low type’s value can be constructed similarly. Let L(z) be
L(z) = E
[
e−rτVL(zτ + ∆, n) | z0 = z
]
, (54)
where τ is the arrival time of a new cash flow from a Poisson process with intensity µL and
zt evolves according to (51). Again, since VL(·, n) has been constructed already, L(z) can be
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evaluated by the induction step. The low type’s value function VL(z, n− 1) is given by
VL(z, n− 1) =

ΦL(z, n− 1), z ≥ z(n− 1)
L(z), z ∈ (z(n− 1), z(n− 1)),
µL+k
r
− (I − (n− 1)), z ≤ z(n− 1).
(55)
B.5 Proof of Proposition 4
Definition 4 The Equilibrium value functions of high type and low type firms, VH and VL,
satisfy the No Deals condition if
VH(t) ≥ µH + k
r
−min
S
{FHM (S) : ptFHM (S) + (1− pt)FLM(S) = I −Nt}, (NDH)
VL(t) ≥ µL + k
r
− (I −Nt). (NDL)
A sufficient condition that grantees the uniqueness of our equilibrium is formalized by
Assumption 3.
Assumption 3 If for some n, zL(n) < zH(n), then WH(z, n) < 0 for all z ∈ (zL(n), zH(n)).
In other words, if zL(n) < zH(n), then the high type would rather wait if the optimal strategy
after a cash flow arrival is pooling, at the belief z + ∆.
The following lemma establishes a simple sufficient condition on the primitive model
parameters for Assumption 3 to hold.12
Lemma 5 If µL is sufficiently close to 0, then Assumption 3 is satisfied.
Proof. Step 1. For a sufficiently high n and a sufficiently low µL, WH(z, n) has only one
root.
First, define zˆH(n) by:
zˆH(n) = sup
{
z : ΦH(z, n) ≤ µH
r
}
, sup{∅} = −∞. (56)
12If Assumption 3 fails, our equilibrium remains a valid equilibrium, although the No Deals condition may
fail, implying potential multiple equilibria. The equilibrium that satisfies the No Deals condition involves a
lower pooling region, but that equilibrium fails the “non-decreasing value function” condition.
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Since immediate pooling at low beliefs is impossible when n = 0 zˆH(0) > −∞, thus, there
exists a maximal n < I such that zˆH(n) > −∞; denote it by n∗.
Notice that when z < zˆH(n), then WH(z, n) is negative:
WH(z, n) vs. 0
µH + k
r
− ΦH(z, n) vs. µH
µH + r
(
µH + k
r
− ΦH(z + ∆, n+ 1)
)
k
r
− ΦH(z, n) vs. µH
µH + r
(
k
r
− 1− ΦH(z + ∆, n+ 1)
)
Since z < zˆH(n) the left hand side is negative. Additionally,
ΦH(z, n) > 1 + ΦH(z, n+ 1),
hence the right hand side of the comparison above is either positive, or negative but larger
that the LHS.
Denote by z∗ = zˆH(n∗) at the original value of µL. As we take µL to 0 the threshold
zˆH(n
∗) only increases, so WH(z, n∗) remains negative for all z < z∗. Moreover, since WH(z, n)
is increasing in n, WH(z, n) < 0 for all z < z
∗ and all n ≤ n∗
Additionally, for all z > z∗ and n < n∗, WH(z, n) and its derivative ∂∂zWH(z, n) can be
approximated (uniformly in z and n) by
WH(z, n) ≈ ΦH(z, n)− µH
µr + r
ΦH(+∞, n+ 1), ∂
∂z
WH(z, n) ≈ ∂
∂z
ΦH(z, n) > 0. (57)
Thus, for sufficiently small µL, WH(z, n) is increasing in z for all z ≥ z∗ and n ≤ n∗.
Step 2. For sufficiently low µL, zL(n
∗) = +∞.
If zL(n
∗) = +∞ at the new (smaller) µL obtained in Step 1, then proceed to Step 3.
Otherwise, notice that as µL → 0, WL(z, n) converges (uniformly in z and n) to
WL(z, n) =
µL + k
r
− n− µL
µL + r
(
µL + k
r
− VL(z + ∆, n+ 1)
)
→ k
r
> 0. (58)
Thus, for sufficiently small µL, zL(n
∗) = +∞.
Step 3.
Recall that zL(n) is an increasing sequence, implying that zL(n) = +∞ for all n > n∗.
For these n, Assumption 3 is satisfied automatically.
For n < n∗, WH(z, n) has only one root. Since WH(+∞, n) > 0 it has to be that
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for z < zH(n), WH(z, n) < 0 and for z > zH(n), WH(z, n) > 0. Hence, if for some n
zL(n) < zH(n) then WH(z, n) < 0 for all z ∈ (zL(n), zH(n)) and the Assumption 3 is
satisfied for these n as well.
Proof of Proposition 4. Equilibrium value functions of Proposition 2 satisfy Non-
Decreasing Value Functions and the second part of the No Deals condition by construction
regardless whether Assumption 3 holds.
We need to verify only the first part of the No Deals condition.
By construction VH(z, I − 1) ≥ ΦH(z, I − 1) for all z. Suppose that VH(z, n) ≥ ΦH(z, n)
has been shown and consider the case of n− 1.
Clearly, z(n− 1) + ∆ > z(n) since otherwise low type would strictly prefer to revel itself
at z(n−1). This leaves us with two cases: z(n−1)+∆ ∈ (z(n), z(n)] or z(n−1)+∆ > z(n).
If z(n− 1) + ∆ ∈ (z(n), z(n)], then
z(n− 1) + ∆ < z(n) < zH(n) < zH(n− 1), (59)
hence
ΦH(z(n− 1), n− 1) < µH
µH + r
ΦH(z(n− 1) + ∆, n)
≤ µH
µH + r
VH(z(n− 1) + ∆, n)
= VH(z(n− 1), n− 1).
If z(n− 1) + ∆ > z(n), then z(n− 1) = zL(n− 1) < zH(n− 1). Thus,
ΦH(z(n− 1), n− 1) < µH
µH + r
ΦH(z(n− 1) + ∆, n)
= VH(z(n− 1), n− 1).
Overall, ΦH(z, n − 1) < VH(z, n − 1) for all z ≤ z(n − 1). For all z > z(n − 1) this
inequality holds by construction given the value of VH(z, n− 1).
C A Credit Line
This appendix shows that a credit line does not eliminate the adverse selection problem.
Without loss of generality, suppose that the credit line is opened at time 0, with a balance
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of X0 > 0 (i.e., the firm borrowed X0). The credit line balance grows at rate r and can be
repaid at any time. The best a high type firm can do is to repay the credit line as soon as
possible, i.e., after each cash flow arrival. Thus, Xt evolves according to:
dXt = rXtdt−min(Xt, 1)dNt, (60)
where Nt is the cumulative cash flow process generated by the firm. The credit line is repaid
in full at time
τ = inf{t > 0 : Xt ≤ 0}. (61)
Denote by fθ(x) the market value of such a credit line conditional on type θ, i.e.,
fθ(x) = E
[ ∫ τ
0
e−rt min(Xt−, 1)dNt
∣∣ θ]. (62)
The function fθ(x) solves:
rfθ(x) =
(µθ + k)(x− fθ(x)) + rxf ′θ(x), if x ≤ 1(µθ + k)(1 + fθ(x− 1)− fθ(x)) + rxf ′θ(x), if x > 1 (63)
with boundary conditions
fθ(0) = 0 fθ(+∞) = µθ + k
r
. (64)
Lemma 6 The market value of the credit line is always below the face value, i.e. fθ(x) < x
for all x > 0.
Proof. Clearly fθ(x) ≤ x. Now suppose that for some xˆ > 0 fθ(xˆ) = xˆ. With the additional
boundary condition fθ(0) = 0, the ODE f is uniquely pinned down as
fθ(x) ≡ x. (65)
However, this function does not satisfy the other boundary condition fθ(+∞) = µθ+kr . Thus,
the market value of the credit line is always below its face value.
Intuitively, fθ(x) < x because for each time T , there is a positive probability that the
firm’s realized cash flows will be lower than the outstanding balance by time T . Given the
above lemma, and the fact that fθ(x) is strictly increasing in µθ, such a credit line would
always incur the high type firm a positive adverse selection cost.
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